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Introduction
The arrival of new decision technologies will
necessitate a profound rethinking both of the
nature of the patient–doctor relationship and of
the way aids and support systems designed to
improve decision-making within that relation-
ship are designed and evaluated. The develop-
ment of decision-analysis based programmes
such as CODA1 DARTS2,3 PORTAL and
ALCHEMIST4 and WEDS5 points to the
growing necessity to distinguish the nature of the
doctor–patient relationship from the modes of
judgment and decision-making employed within
that relationship. Implicitly one-dimensional
typologies of the traditional ‘paternalist/shared/
informed’6 sort do not separate these two
dimensions, nor do they provide the complexity
called for by the heterogeneity of patient’s
‘meta-preferences’ regarding each. A multidi-
mensional matrix embodying this distinction is
proposed as a framework of the minimal
complexity required for the design and evalua-
tion of the full range of decision aids and deci-
sion modes. Essentially aids should be conceived
of and evaluated cell-specifically and the search
for universally satisfactory decision support
systems abandoned. The decision process which
emerges when patient’s meta-preferences
regarding relationship model and decision mode
are fulfilled may be very dierent from that
which would constitute ‘shared’ or ‘informed’
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Abstract
The arrival of new analysis-based decision technologies will neces-
sitate a profound rethinking both of the nature of the patient–
doctor relationship and of the way aids and support systems
designed to improve decision-making within that relationship are
designed and evaluated. One-dimensional typologies of the tradi-
tional ‘paternalist/shared/informed’ sort do not provide the
complexity called for by the heterogeneity of patient’s ‘meta-pref-
erences’ regarding their relationship with a doctor on the one hand
and regarding the analytical level of judgement and decision-
making on the other. A multidimensional matrix embodying this
distinction is proposed as a framework of the minimal complexity
required for the design and evaluation of the full range of decision
aids and decision modes. Essentially aids should be conceived of
and evaluated cell-specifically and the search for universally satis-
factory decision support systems abandoned. ‘shared’ and
‘informed’ are best interpreted as attributes which may or not be in
line with a patient’s meta-preferences. Future research should focus
on the higher level goal of better decision-making, a goal that will
need to respect and reflect these meta-preferences.
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decision-making, as well as dierent from that
which would maximize fulfilment of the patient’s
conventional health outcome preferences.
‘Shared’ and ‘informed’ are therefore best
interpreted as attributes of the relationship
model, with future research focusing on the
more relevant, higher level, goal of better decis-
ion-making. This is a concept which will have to
embrace both meta- and health state preferences
and patients will be genuinely empowered only
when they make any needed trade-o between
fulfilment of their meta-preferences and their
health state preferences on an informed and
transparent basis.
Evaluating decision aids and decision
technologies
The purpose of CODA, the Clinical Guidance
Program1 (CGP) is to provide, in real clinical
time, the quantitative results of modelling a
management decision, using the best available
evidence- or more realistically a highly defens-
ible body of evidence – in conjunction with the
patient’s preferences over health outcome states
elicited in situ. The program is best thought of as
providing a decision analysis-based ‘third
opinion’ rather than as a decision aid or support
as conventionally conceived (see below). It is
accordingly very dierent from previous systems
such as decision board7–9 the probability or
treatment trade-o method10–12 and various
‘interactive’ video programmes.13–15 General-
ising about these, Holmes-Rovner writes
Decision supports go beyond traditional informed-
consent approaches, to engage the patient in
grappling with the elements of the decision, as well
as understanding the alternatives. … Some incor-
porate values or utilities, in a heuristic, but not
prescriptive fashion. Most have decision analysis
behind them to organize the presentation of the
outcome data, but do not explicitly reveal the
rational intent of the analysis. They deliberately
leave out the ‘right’ answer.16
However, the fundamental aim of CODA and
other CGPs is to make transparent the ‘rational’
intent of the analysis and to oer the answer
produced by that analysis. However, this
‘answer’ is properly characterized as a defensible
candidate for ‘best’ answer, rather than for
‘right’ answer, because the latter will rarely if
ever exist. And it is only a candidate for best
answer, given the assumptions, data and struc-
tural/institutional constraints built into its use.
However, this qualification is true of all modes
of decision-making, including any that will be
used instead of the CGP or to reject its guidance.
One vital consequence is that we are primarily
concerned with the quality of its guidance and
not whether that guidance is accepted and/or
implemented. There are multiple reasons why
guidance of the highest quality might be rejected
(Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground is a more
readable source than most psychological texts)
and CODA makes no attempt to persuade the
patient (or doctor) to follow the guidance, other
than noting that the result follows from a serious
analysis of the decision using the patient’s
preferences over outcome states. The third
O’Connor criterion for the evaluation of a
decision aid17 – that it is ‘eective’ (i.e. imple-
mented) – is accordingly seen as inappropriate,
in that it assumes either that patients are
‘rational’ or that it is the function of the aid to
make them more so.
As a practical way of implementing decision
analysis in the clinical encounter the CGP is put
forward rather as a mode of decision-making – a
way of arriving at clinical decisions or recom-
mendations – not something which is seen as
making a contribution to, or within, some other
mode of decision-making. The main alternative,
and currently dominant, modes of decision-
making are ‘traditional clinical judgement’ on
the one hand and ‘evidence-based clinical
expertise’ (increasingly facilitated through
evidence-based guideline statements or algo-
rithms) on the other.18 (Decision-making by
following a ‘knowledge-based expert system’
represents a third but largely hypothetical
possibility.)
How, then, should an intervention such as a
CGP be evaluated? Is it really an ‘intervention’
at all? Most researchers designing evaluation
instruments19,20 assume that decision aids
should be designed to help the patient make an
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informed choice in a decision-making process
where the mode of decision-making used by the
clinician is a given and usually assumed to be
‘traditional clinical judgment’. Most current
research and commentary on decision aids and
support systems also assumes that the key
patient preferences that need eliciting (or
constructing) are those impinging on choices
regarding the medical management of their
condition, typically phrased as the patient’s
preferences in relation to the knowledge and
information necessary to adequately compre-
hend ‘the risks’ and ‘the benefits’ of the various
options.
The new modes of decision-making (‘decision
technologies’) now becoming available and sure
to multiply rapidly in the coming decades, call
both these assumptions into question and
necessitate serious re-thinking of the methodo-
logy of evaluation. Two key issues warrant
attention.
One concerns the distinction between know-
ledge validity and decision validity in relation to
the inputs into any decision-making process.
This distinction is developed elsewhere in the
context of the ‘condition-specific measure’ vs.
‘generic measure’ debate in Health-Related
Quality of Life21 and cannot be considered
further here. The most important implication
for the current paper is that the application
of knowledge validity criteria in advance of
decision validity criteria is a frequent accompa-
niment of partial or noncomparative evalua-
tion.22,23 In this deviation from sound practice
the flaws or limitations of a particular method or
approach (e.g. decision analysis), established in
isolation, are regarded as conclusive without any
or adequate consideration of the equivalent
flaws or limitations of the alternatives (e.g.
clinical judgment).
The issue on which we concentrate here
concerns the way the clinical consultation is
analysed and modelled. Previous analysts have
constructed insightful taxonomies6,24 but all
have been implicitly or explicitly seeking a uni-
dimensional classification. The emergence of
CGPs, and to a lesser extent expert- and/or
evidence-based clinical guidelines, makes it clear
that two dimensions are needed. They derive
from what can be conceptualized as the two
meta-decisions that are made before a clinical
encounter proceeds. By definition, these involve
deciding how to decide. Meta-decision 1 deter-
mines which model of the physician-patient
relationship is to apply at the outset of the
consultation (and, as default, throughout it).
Meta-decision 2 determines which modes of
judgment and decision-making are to be
adopted within the selected model of the
consultation. Currently both are made implicitly
and (generally) with no explicit discussion or
patient consultation. As soon as their existence
is recognized it becomes apparent that patients
will have dierent ‘meta-preferences’ in relation
to each and should be able to make informed
choices on the basis of these two sets of meta-
preferences. In the following section we propose
a model/mode matrix as a framework within
which patients could specify the cells, or cell
clusters, within which they wish to locate the
upcoming consultation. Clinicians would be
entitled to (explicitly) opt out of oering
consultation located in particular cells, but
increasingly be expected to be competent to
perform in multiple roles and modes.
The evidence for the existence of strong meta-
preferences of the first type has been around for
a long time25–27 and recent writings confirm it in
a variety of clinical contexts. Two examples will
suce.
Interviewees were divided in their preferences for
nondirective counselling: 46% would have liked to
get direct advice from the counsellor, 36% said the
counsellor should only provide information and
not advise the couple about the right decision, and
the remainder had mixed feelings. …Genetic
counselling is one of the first medical areas to
adopt a nondirective, patient participation
approach as its norm – an approach that conflicts
with client’s prior experience with a directive,
paternalistic medical environment. Counsellees
were equally divided between those who approved
and disapproved of this counselling strategy28.
[Our] findings are consistent with other research
indicating that younger, more educated patients
generally prefer a more active and participatory
role in medical consultations and decision-making
Ó Blackwell Science Ltd 2002 Health Expectations, 5, pp.16–27
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than do older and less educated patients. However,
patients’ perceptions of involvement and control
over decision-making did not dier for patients
diering in age and education. …Some people
(termed ‘blunters’) generally avoid information
related to their condition while others (referred to
as ‘monitors’) actively seek out this information.
…Future studies …should assess patient¢ prefer-
ences for their own and their physicians involve-
ment to see if these beliefs explain why some
patients are more active communicators than are
others.29
In view of the consistency of this finding what
is surprising is that many studies still seem
frustrated by their failure to establish solid
generalizations about patients (or aids). They
treat the heterogeneity of patients’ preferences as
confounders rather than as a fundamental
starting point for useful work. A number of
reviews and overviews have implicitly accepted
this framing.30–32 The resulting frustration
disappears if the evidence is interpreted in the
light of meta-preferences and in a later paper
Entwistle notes that:
…individual patients and clinicians vary in their
preferences for dierent approaches and their
ability to adopt particular roles in decision-
making. Imposing an approach with which either
or both parties are uncomfortable may be incon-
sistent with the notions of respect for individual
choice that many of the approaches aim to
support.33
She notes that most developers of conceptual
models of clinical decision involving patients
have adopted a particular normative model,
usually one in which the patient plays either a
collaborative or an autonomous role. But full
acceptance of Entwhistle’s point will require
abandoning two of the basic assumptions held
by most of those in the patient empowerment
field. One, that patients should become more
involved and participatory, because it is in their
interests to do so – either for the instrumental
reason that it is better for their health or because
they simply ought to be more autonomous and
resistant to directive paternalism. (In most cases
for both reasons.). Two, that becoming more
informed is a necessary condition of being more
involved.
Interventions to support decision-making can
be seen as aecting a wide range of processes
and outcomes, such as:
…knowledge and understanding; who contributes
in what way to decision-making; what factors
influence the choice made; the lengths of (and
hence the costs and numbers of other available)
consultations; the quality of the decision made;
professional-patient relationships (in both the
short and longer term); the delivery of health-care;
health-related behaviours; the outcomes of health-
care; people’s general sense of wellbeing; and their
expectations and satisfaction of patients, their
families and health professionals with various
aspects of health-care and its outcomes. People will
have dierent opinions about which of these
criteria are most important and how they value
particular eects.33
But the vital methodological issue is whose
preferences are to be accorded priority in respect
of any and all of such aspects. If it is accepted
that it is the individual patient’s preferences that
count then the idea that aids and supports can
be evaluated in anything but preference-based
trials, where the preferences relate to aspects of
the decision-making process and not to
management options, is ruled out.
The first assumption (that patients should
become more involved) is typically left latent
rather than made manifest, so the fact that it
clashes with the view, typically quite explicit in
the same writing, that patient’s preferences
should be respected, is rarely noticed, let alone
highlighted. But the conflict is clear and once it
is exposed one needs to take a position on it.
Our personal position is that patient’s current
meta-preferences should be respected in the
upcoming clinical consultation, and that it is the
task of education, as in all other areas of
personal life, to ‘develop’ these preferences and
ensure that they are based on adequate know-
ledge and exploration of the consequences of
holding dierent ones. The clinical consultation
is not the place for this personal preference
development in relation to health-care decision-
making and it should not be seen as exclusively
or even primarily the responsibility of doctors.
The second assumption (that becoming more
informed is a necessary condition of becoming
Ó Blackwell Science Ltd 2002 Health Expectations, 5, pp.16–27
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more involved) seems so obviously true that it is
never questioned. However, as we will see when
we set up the model/mode matrix, the most
‘rational’ and involved of all patients may be one
who seeks intense value clarification and
substantial decision responsibility – but wants
little or no ‘information’.
The model-mode matrix for clinical
decision-making
The patient is assumed to have preferences
regarding the way judgements and decisions are
made about their medical care as well as pref-
erences regarding the health states that are the
foci of those judgements and decisions. Speci-
fically, they have a preferred model of the
doctor–patient relationship and, conceptually
independent though probably empirically
correlated, a preferred mode of judgement and
decision-making within that preferred type of
relationship. These two meta-preferences are
relevant to the two meta-decisions taken before
a consultation begins. At the moment these are
taken implicitly, but we can envisage them
increasingly being taken explicitly as the range
of decision technologies expands and patients
(and doctors) come to know of their availability
through the internet and personal networks.
These meta-preferences relate to the indi-
vidual consultation. They may vary from case to
case, not only as the presenting condition of the
patient changes, but also as the sequence of
consultations within an episodes progress. The
degree to which the initially agreed character of
a consultation can be changed during it would
be up to the parties, but the existence of flexi-
bility in this respect in no way undermines the
value of the framework in locating and illu-
minating what is going on at any point. Neither
does the ‘instability’ of an individual’s meta-
preferences through time. Such lability of
preferences is well-known to make analytical
decision-making more dicult but its existence
is not a ground for ignoring or denying it.
It might seem that these meta-preferences
relate exclusively to what Elwyn and co-
workers call ‘the second half of the consulta-
tion’.34 They are referring to general practice,
where the early rituals of the consultation can
certainly take up a high proportion of the
available time. But even here we suggest that a
clearer identification of all management decis-
ion-making (including decisions about diag-
nostic strategies as well as therapy) will bring a
very high fraction of the encounter within the
scope of the framework.
At this stage the precise specification and
wording of the attributes and levels are still
under development, as is the instrument to
capture patient’s meta-preferences. However,
this is the appropriate time to air the broad
issue. It may or may not be necessary to point
out that any suggestion that the framework is
too simple needs to be made in full realization of
the practical consequences of further additions.
And that any suggestion that it is too complex
involves denying the importance of distin-
guishing between the identified elements.
The multidimensional model
of the relationship
What the patient wants from the doctor
The patient’s relationship with the doctor is
defined in terms of the three functions which the
patient wants the doctor to undertake (or not, as
the case may be). Each function has 3 levels.
These are numbered 2, 1, and 0, but no
weighting or other normative significance is
implied by their use.
Decision responsibility
2. Make the decision
1. Provide specific (directive) guidance or
recommendation
0. Oer generalized or nondirective advice
Information provision
2. Full decision structure and numerical proba-
bilities
1. Simplified decision structure, selected proba-
bilities (a few numerical, most verbal)
0. General verbal description of options, main
possible outcomes and chances
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Value clarification
2. Full (quantitative) utility elicitation
1. Selected questioning (qualitative); possible
quantitative testing of a key trade-o
0. Generalized conversation (or none)
Explicitly outside the model are things which
it is assumed all patients will expect to receive
(and all doctors expect to deliver), such as:
• emotional support appropriate from a caring
professional;
• courtesy, confidentiality and ecient admin-
istration of the management process, and
• responsible implementation/performance (often
as the licensed ‘doer’) of any decision taken,
e.g. prescription preparation, surgery.
Also excluded is an aspect in which patients
will vary, but does not warrant separate atten-
tion:
• provision of requested basic knowledge of a
purely biological or technical sort. (Insofar as
such information is decision-relevant it is
covered in the Information attribute.)
While there is nothing radically new in this
framework, it does dier significantly from all
previous suggestions in numerous ways. For
example, in relation to the pioneering Autonomy
Preference Index of Ende and co-workers35 with
its decision-making and information seeking
components, we distinguish clearly between
‘decision’ and ‘recommendation’ in relation to the
former, confine ‘information’ to that which is
decision-relevant and give the term specific
content, and, finally, add the now accepted as
essential value clarification component.
The modes of judgement
and decision-making
How the patient wants the doctor to arrive
at what he or she provides
The patient has preferred modes of judgement
and decision-making. These define how they
wish the above functions to be fulfilled by the
doctor, in other words the mode they would like
to be treated as primary in each case and given
dominant weight or emphasis. The modes are
defined in terms of the Analysis-to-Intuition
Ratio of Hammond’s Cognitive Continuum.36–
38 where increases in the A–I ratio involve
increases in the precision with which concepts
are defined, relationships are specified and
magnitudes are measured. Higher A–I ratios
generally reflect and require increasing control
over the task. Note that increased precision will
often take the form of being more ‘precisely
inexact’.
The six broad modes imposed on the conti-
nuum (Fig. 1) are exemplified – not defined – as
follows:
6. personal experience-based clinical judgement
5. evidence-based consensual expertise and
guidelines
4. decision analytic modelling
3. the observational/epidemiological study
2. the randomized controlled trial
1. the scientific experiment
The numbering of the modes has no intrinsic
normative significance other than providing an
ordinal indication of the A–I ratio. Modes 1–3
are essentially research ones, so mode 4 is
actually the highest A–I ratio in the present,
practice decision-making, context.
The model-mode matrix
Crossing model with mode creates an initial
matrix of 27 cells and forms a framework within
which we can explore the issues surrounding the
evaluation of the clinical consultation in general
and the contribution of decision aids and
support systems in particular.
In fact, the 27 cells quickly reduce to 18, as
Table 1 shows.
Three cells, labelled x–ia, disappear when it is
recognized that higher information provision
preferences cannot be fulfilled by insuciently
analytical modes. And another 6 are lost when
the patient’s desired level of involvement in
value clarification rules out 3 as insuciently
analytical and 3 as over-analytical (x–oa).
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Of course many cell preferences (most of those
where the Mode is 4 or 5) could not be accom-
modated at the moment, even if requested by
patients from doctors willing in principle to oer
such modes. It is important to remember that
our intention here is to ensure that evaluation of
the new technologies capable of fulfilling these
preferences are properly evaluated as and when
they do arrive.
There are many more than 18 possible indi-
vidual sets of preferences in the framework
because each of the nine valid Decision respon-
sibility (DR) cells may, at least in principle, be
coupled with any of the six valid Information
provision (IP) ones and with any of the three
valid Value clarification (VC) ones. The total
number of permutations is therefore 162. No
particular point is served at the moment by
presenting a full tabulation. A few selected
examples should enable the reader to assess the
value of the framework for determining the
suitability or unsuitability of particular aids or
Judgement and decision mode
(reflecting Analysis–Intuition ratio)
Relationship model 6 Low A–I 5 Medium A–I 4 High A–I
Decision responsibility 2
1
0
Information provision 2 (x–ia) (x–ia)
1 (x–ia)
0
Value clarification 2 (x–ia) (x–ia)
1 (x–ia) (x–oa)
0 (x–oa) (x–oa)
Table 1 The model-mode matrix
ANALYSIS
INTUITIONQuality
of
Intuition
Quality
of
Analysis
Least
precise /
explicit
Most
precise /
explicit
Definition of concepts
specification of relationships
measurement of magnitudes
"7" 6 5 4 3 2 1MODE
Scientific
experiment
Randomized
controlled
trial
Case-
control
study
Expert
consensus
judgement
Non-
cognitive
'judgement'
Clinical
judgementKnowledge generation
Decision/policy making
Descriptive
(positive)
model
Expert
consensus
decision
Non-
cognitive
'decision'
Clinical
judgement
Decision
(normative)
model
Exemplifications:
Figure 1 The cognitive dimension of the Cognitive Continuum framework.
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supports and ensuring that their evaluation is
conducted properly.
The patient meta-preference codes come in the
form of a pair of numbers for each dimension.
Within each pair the first number represents the
preference level within the dimension concerned,
the second the Mode preference for that
dimension.
Example 1: DR2/6-IP0/6-VC0/6
This is the patient who says ‘do what is best for
me doctor’, wants the doctor to take the decision
without bothering them with information or
value clarification and prefers the doctor to base
his or her decision on their traditional clinical
judgement. The importance of distinguishing
model frommode is confirmed when we point out
that DR2/5 – IP0/6 – VC0/6 and DR2/4 – IP0/6 –
VC0/6 are identical to our example in terms of
their relationship desires, but wish the doctor to
take his decision on their behalf by a more
analytical approach, for example by a Clinical
Guidance Program in the case of DR2/4 – IP0/6 –
VC0/6. (They would have to use default popula-
tion values in the analysis, given that this patient
does not want any personal value clarification.)
Example 2: DR0/6 – IP1/5 – VC1/5
The patient who says ‘I want to take the decision
myself without even a recommendation, but I
would like a fair bit of decision-relevant infor-
mation and some help in clarifying my values’.
The treatment trade-o approach and the
O’Connor weigh scale aid39–41 would seem to be
ideally suited to this patient. The standard
decision board is more appropriate for DR0/6 –
IP1/5 – VC0/6 who prefers to opt out of any
value clarification.
Example 3: DR1/4 – IP0/6 – VC2/4
The patient who says ‘What I want is a specific
recommendation, based on a decision analysis of
the choice facing me which draws on full elici-
tation of my preferences and combines them
with the best available evidence. I don’t want to
be burdened with any of the latter.’ The CGP is
ideal for this patient. The ‘decision analysis
information model’ of Holmes-Rovner and co-
workers42 would not be suitable in this case, but
could be for DR1/4 – IP1/5 – VC1/5, who does
want some information. However, in taking over
4 h their intervention is accepted to be unreal-
istic clinically. We see it as undertaking some of
the wider educational task that is essential, but
regard as most appropriately located prior to
and outside any clinical encounter of immediate
significance to the patient. Patient education
needs to be clearly dierentiated from patient
decision support and undertaken from a patient-
not medico-centred perspective.43
Example 4: DR1/5 – IP1/5 – VC1/5
The patient who constitutes the implicit
normative ideal for many authors in the ‘shared
and informed’ literature.
Seeing things through this framework makes
it clear that the patient’s preferred model/mode
combination will predetermine the answers to
many of the issues currently under discussion
within the decision aid literature, for example,
how the patient’s reactions to the revelation of
uncertainty and need for trading-o among
outcome dimensions are to be regarded. It also
makes clear that any unidimensional classifica-
tion system of ‘consultation types and styles’,
(e.g. paternalist/shared/informed) cannot reflect
the minimal complexity of patients’ meta-pref-
erences. As a result it should significantly aect
how evaluation of decision support instruments
and programmes is conceived and conducted. In
brief, the methodology of evaluation needs to be
cell-specific and the search for generalizations
about the eectiveness of aids for ‘patients’ (as a
single category) abandoned as likely to be
misleading and of dubious or no policy signifi-
cance. The ‘satisfaction’ with an aid or support
system reported by patients in studies using this
concept will be largely determined by their meta-
preferences.
Apart from its impact on evaluation, formal
recognition of the existence of these meta-pref-
erences and meta-decisions should also ensure
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that patients become able to choose openly and
explicitly the extent to which they wish to be
decisionally ‘empowered’ and ‘autonomous’,
helping give a content to those terms which is
often missing. What Ende and co-workers
stressed in 1989 remains valid.
Each patient’s preference is his or her own and
depends upon individual factors, modulated by
illness. Enthusiasm for interventions designed to
enhance patient autonomy should not interfere
with the patient’s privilege, which is to receive care
and support from a knowledgeable physician. The
physician-patient relationship should be based not
on preordained policies, but rather on an accom-
modation to each patient’s preferences and
needs.35
The arrival of new decision technologies
simply requires that the patient’s privileges be
extended to encompass preferences over the
analytical-to-intuitive ratio with which know-
ledgeable physicians undertake the multiple
tasks they face in the consultation.
Conclusions
The current movement for patient empower-
ment largely takes for granted the virtues of
‘shared’ decision-making and/or ‘informed’
decision-making. The time has come for the
focus to move from all such intermediate and
partial goals to the top-level goal of better
decision-making. Since we take it as axiomatic
that any concept of ‘better’ must have a basis
in preferences our framework suggests that two
fundamental sets of preferences are relevant to
‘better decision-making’. One set is made up of
the patient’s meta-preferences regarding the
process of decision-making, i.e. preferred rela-
tionship model and preferred judgement and
decision modes. A decision will be better to
the extent that it reflects these meta-prefer-
ences. The second is the patient’s preferences
over the health state outcomes that are
involved in the decision. Here, a decision will
be better to the extent that, given these pref-
erences, it reflects the best relevant patient-
specific evidence. If, as seems likely, there will
often be conflict between maximising these
distinct sets of preferences, the ethical answer
is (presumably) that the competent patient is
the one who must make the necessary trade-o
– subject to any constraints flowing from the
publicly funded character of the health-care
system.
It has only been possible to adhere to simple,
three or four way, unidimensional, models of the
doctor–patient relationship because only one
decision technology has been available until
recently – that referred to as ‘clinical judgement’.
But as new decision technologies, embodying
increasing analytical content, become available44
the attempt to fit things within these simple
frameworks will be increasingly invalid and
unproductive. The necessity of disentangling
relationship model from judgement and decision
mode will become ever more starkly evident. A
multiattribute model of the relationship which
distinguishes the conceptually independent
attributes of decisional responsibility, informa-
tion provision, and value clarification, seems
requisitely complex as well as mapping appro-
priately on to the alternative modes of judge-
ment and decision-making. The question of
precisely which patient preferences are to be
respected, and how, is made transparent and
unfudgable. And the foundation for a coherent
and transparent doctor–patient encounter laid.
If patient preferences are to be taken seriously
they must be taken as fundamental in the same
way that their clinical condition is taken as
fundamental. No one would suggest trialling a
drug targeted at a particular disease on a
random group of patients, irrespective of their
diagnosis. In relation to the design and evalua-
tion of decision aids and modes, meta-prefer-
ences regarding relationship model and
judgement and decision-making mode should be
treated as the equivalent of the clinical condi-
tion.
In summary
Any further research on patient involvement in
decision-making should be focused on the search
for the best or better decision and address the
issues of shared and informed decision-making
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within a framework that focuses on this top-level
target.
Any concept of better or improved decisions
will need to be patient preference-based (as well
as evidence-based) and should embrace the
meta-preferences of patients over the doctor–
patient relationship on the one hand and the
modes of judgment and decision-making within
that relationship on the other.
The doctor–patient relationship is most
usefully conceptualized within a multiattribute
model structure with Decision Responsibility,
Information Provision, and Value Clarification
as the key dimensions.
The judgement and decision modes must be
regarded as distinct since the DR–IP–VC
dimensions can be fulfilled at very dierent
analytical-to-intuitive ratios.
Crossing the two dimensions establishes a
matrix of cells that can be used to locate the
heterogeneous population of patients and, since
evaluation of decision aids should be cell-spe-
cific, help develop appropriate methodologies
for this exercise.
In the DR–IP–VC model as proposed each of
the 3 dimensions has 3 levels. The precise
number of levels and their characterization are
less important than the need for some such
structure. The matrix should be requisitely
complex – as simple as possible given the task
for which it is needed and no more. Familiar
simple classifications such as the ‘paternal-
shared-informed’ models of the doctor–patient
relationship are no longer up to the task, though
they have stimulated much useful work in the
field.
The recognition and respecting of patient
meta-preferences will need to be accompanied
by a realization that fulfilment of these may not
be fully compatible with fulfilment of patient’s
health state preferences. (In other words
seeking the optimal course of action in relation
to the latter may rule out some meta-preference
fulfilling cells.) Patients can be regarded as truly
empowered only when they are made aware of
this possible conflict and make any needed
trade-os on an informed and transparent
basis.
Modes of clinical decision-making can be
properly evaluated only (a) in relation to each
other and (b) without assuming any particular
mode is best a priori and hence constitutes the
‘gold standard’. Breach of either rule constitutes
partial or noncomparative evaluation.
All evaluation, including cell-specific evalua-
tion of decision aids and modes, should be by
the most rigorous interventionist methodology
practical, ideally at mode 2 or 3 as with other
technologies. Clinicians should not seek, or be
allowed, to resist such evaluations on the unac-
ceptable ground that such studies would be
‘unethical’ or unnecessary because clinical
judgement can or must be taken as the gold
standard decision technology.
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